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‘Affordability’ and the political 







The ‘affordability’ of new or expanded social protection programmes depends 
on more than an assessment of the fiscal costs or the poverty-reducing or 
developmental benefits. Diverse international organisations have showed that 
programmes costing less than or about 1 percent of GDP have substantial 
benefits, and most low-income countries have the ‘fiscal space’ for such 
programmes (including through increased taxation). These international 
organisations have generally failed to convince national policy-making elites to 
raise and to allocate scarce domestic resources to social protection 
programmes. The result is an ‘affordability gap’ between what is advocated for 
African countries and what those countries’ governments are willing to spend. 
This paper examines four cases of contestation over the ‘affordability’ of social 
protection reforms in Africa: Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and the semi-
autonomous territory of Zanzibar. In all four cases political elites resisted or 
rejected proposals for expensive reforms. In practice, the most expensive 
reforms that were approved were ones costing only 0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP. 
The governments of Zambia and Botswana generally resisted even expenditures 
of this magnitude. The cost ceiling for reforms is far below the estimates of 






Across much (but not all) of Africa the social protection debate pits international 
agencies, aid donors and their local allies (mostly in civil society) favouring the 
expansion of social protection – although often in divergent directions – against 
domestic political elites who resist proposals that the state should provide direct 
income support to the poor. This debate often appears to counterpose empirical 
and normative arguments: Advocates of social protection present evidence of the 
positive effects of social protection on poverty-reduction and development, 
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whilst local elites assert that states should not let the poor become ‘dependent’ 
on ‘handouts’.1  
 
The issue of ‘affordability’ spans both empirical and normative approaches. 
Whilst often presented as a straightforward empirical issue – what can be 
afforded within reasonable fiscal constraints? – the issue of affordability has 
inevitable distributional implications that render the issue as much a normative 
as an empirical one: Should states impose additional taxes, and on whom, in 
order to finance cash transfer programmes? Should they spend scarce resources 
on cash transfers, and for whom, if the opportunity cost is undoubtedly 
important expenditure on (for example) education or health care or 
infrastructure? When local elites resist arguments that social protection 
programmes are ‘affordable’, they are almost certainly fusing apparently 
technocratic arguments (about the consequences of raising taxes or increasing 
debt or depriving other areas of public expenditure) with normative ones (about 
who should get what and who should be paying for what). 
 
What states choose to do or not to do is resolved politically. In the 2000s, 
neither international agencies nor aid donors have the kind of ‘hard’ power that 
they enjoyed in the 1980s, when conditions could easily be attached to bridging 
finance. Despite massive aid flows, their power was primarily ‘soft’. This is not 
to say that they have no power: Soft power can be potent, not only in terms of 
framing the policy-making agenda but also in terms of strengthening reformers 
by providing them with the ‘evidence’ that undercuts resistance and facilitating 
implementation through technical assistance. Soft power thus shapes and feeds 
into political struggles over policy-making, and especially over the raising and 
allocation of public revenues. 
 
In this paper, I examine political arguments about, and discourses of, 
‘affordability’ in Anglophone East and Southern Africa. The first half of the 
paper examines the arguments about affordability put forward by international 
organisations including, especially, the ILO. The second half of the paper 
examines the politics of affordability in four cases: Botswana (over the fifty 
years following independence in 1966), South Africa (focusing on the reform of 
child benefits following democratization in 1994, Zambia (focusing specifically 
on the mid-2000s, when social protection was resisted strongly) and Zanzibar (in 
the mid-2010s, during deliberation over the introduction of universal old-age 
pensions). These cases are not presented as being typical or representative. 
Rather, they illustrate distinct scenarios in the politics of ‘affordability’. The 
                                                          
1 This juxtaposition is not as neat as it often seems, however: International agencies and aid 
donors generally hold a normative position in favour of state interventions (at least for some 
groups of deserving poor) whilst the views of local elites are often rooted in the evidence 
derived from their personal experience (which they privilege over more systematic studies). 
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four cases include one country (Botswana) that grew from low- to middle-
income, one (South Africa) that was middle-income throughout the period under 
review, and two that remained low-income (Zambia and Zanzibar) (see Figure 
1).2 The differences in terms of GDP per capita are substantial: By the early 
2000s, GDP per capita in Botswana and South Africa was about ten times higher 




Figure 1: GDP per capita since 1966 
 
 
There are also obvious political differences between these four cases. South 
Africa (since 1994) and Botswana have governments elected through free and 
fair elections, and states with unusually-developed systems of taxation and 
social protection. In Zambia and Zanzibar, democracy is clearly flawed, with 
persistent allegations that elections have been either unfree or unfair or both, and 
their states have less capacity.  
 
Public welfare provision developed along quite different lines in the four cases 
(see Figure 2). In Zambia, successive governments have generally been reluctant 
to take responsibility for or to expand cash transfer programmes that were 
initiated, on an experimental basis, by donors. In Zanzibar, after considerable 
debate over affordability, universal old-age pensions were introduced in 2016, 
although only for the very elderly and with modest benefits. In South Africa, a 
Child Support Grant (CSG) was introduced and repeatedly expanded despite 
continuing anxieties about affordability. Botswana, finally, used its rapidly 
growing resources from minerals to expand its welfare state, but it did so in 
                                                          
2 Data on South Africa, Botswana and Zambia: World Development Indicators (WDI), 

































































































































distinctly conservative ways, such that its welfare state in the 2000s is quite 
different to its similarly-developed neighbour, South Africa. In all four cases 














South Africa Zanzibar 
 




Estimating the fiscal cost of social protection 
 
International agencies – led by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and 
the World Bank – emphasise that sub-Saharan African countries are, in general, 
laggards in terms of expenditure on social protection. The ILO’s World Social 
Protection Report (ILO, 2014) and the World Bank’s State of Social Safety Nets 
(World Bank, 2015) both present data that suggest that spending in Africa is 
consistently lower than in most other parts of the world. The ILO reports, for 
example, that Africa has the lowest expenditure in relation to GDP on either 
pensions for the elderly or child benefits, and the lowest proportion of 
unemployed workers receiving unemployment benefits. Health coverage, 
measured in terms of the proportion of the population affiliated to public health 
systems or private insurance schemes, is also lowest in Africa, at 25 percent of 
the population compared with 61 percent globally (ILO, 2014). In Africa, only 
2.8 percent of GDP is spent on ‘social security’, compared with a global average 
of 5.8 percent, according to World Bank studies (World Bank, 2012b, 2015; see 
also Garcia and Moore, 2012).  
 
Elsewhere I have argued that welfare regimes in Africa should be viewed as 
moving down a distinct trajectory rather than as laggards following countries in 
other regions down a standard path (Seekings, 2013, 2014). This is in part 
because various categories of expenditure – including especially agrarian 
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welfare programmes3 and food programmes4, as well as programmes funded by 
non-state agencies – are often excluded from the data. Regardless of the merits 
of this argument, it is clear that there is significant international pressure on 
African governments to expand their apparent expenditures on social protection, 
and international agencies and aid donors emphasise strongly that expanded 
expenditure is affordable. African governments themselves have nominally 
committed themselves to the expansion of social protection, although with a 
strong emphasis on strengthening the family. Every two years since 2008, the 
African Union has convened a conference of ‘Ministers in charge of Social 
Development’. The first conference, in Windhoek (Namibia), approved a Social 
Policy Framework for Africa and adopted the Windhoek Declaration on Social 
Development.5 The AU also endorsed social protection in its Ouagadougou 
Declaration (2004), and Livingstone Declaration (2006) (Wright & Noble, 
2010).6 
 
What it would cost to expand social protection depends, of course, on how 
extensive the system would be. Evidence on the costs of programmes comes 
from two sources: The actual costs of existing programmes, including pilot or 
experimental programmes that can be scaled up; and modeling the prospective 
costs of possible programmes, using appropriate economic and demographic 
data to gauge the effects of conditions on coverage. Given that administrative 
costs and other overheads tend to be low (except for public employment 
programmes, where supervision and materials can account for a significant 
fraction of total costs), the most important determinants of costs are the 
eligibility conditions (such as the age threshold for pensions and any means-test 




                                                          
3 For example, should programmes such as Malawi’s Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme 
(AISP), later transformed into the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP), be counted as 
social protection (Hagen-Zanker and McCord, 2010)? 
4 The World Bank’s State of Social Safety Nets 2015 includes (I think for the first time) in-
kind transfers and school feeding programmes in its assessment of social safety nets. It reports 
that, globally, 718 million people received cash transfers, including through workfare, whilst 
600 million received in-kind transfers, 276 million participated in school feeding 
programmes, and 381 million benefitted from fee waivers or targeted transfers. 
5 Subsequent ministerial conferences were held in Khartoum in November 2010, Addis Ababa 
in November 2012 and again in May 2014. 
6 Wright & Noble note that the reference to social protection in the Framework was inserted at 
the last minute. Most poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and national development 
plans (NDPs) initiated between 2005 and 2010 mentioned social protection, but most did not 
include any substantial discussion of it (UNECA, 2011). 
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Modelling the costs of prospective programmes, 
2005-10 
 
In 2005, both the ILO and World Bank completed their first detailed studies 
costing social protection in lower-income African countries. Kakwani & 
Subbarao (2005, 2007), for the World Bank, examined the role of pensions in 
reducing poverty among the elderly in 15 African countries. They concluded 
their study with a simple cost calculation: A universal social pension, set at 70 
percent of each country’s poverty line for men and women from the age of 60 
would cost between 1 and 4 percent of GDP. The cost would decline massively, 
however, if benefits were more parsimonious (set at, say, 35 percent of the 
poverty threshold), the age of eligibility was higher (65 rather than 60 years), or 
the programme was targeted on the poor (through a means-test). Kakwani & 
Subbarao concluded that the case for a generous, universal pension was weak in 
terms of both reducing poverty and fiscal affordability. Allocating substantial 
sums to pensions would clearly crowd out other, more important programmes, 
including basic health care or provision for poorer groups of people including 
children. Kakwani & Subbarao were more positive, however, about a targeted, 
parsimonious pension.  
 
At the same time an ILO team costed a set of social assistance programmes for 
seven low-income countries in Africa (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania).7 Pal et al. (2005) costed universal old-
age pensions, child benefits and disability grants, with different benefit levels 
and (for children) eligibility conditions. A universal old-age pension of US$ 
0.50/day (adjusted for purchasing power) paid to all men and women above the 
age of 65 would cost about 0.5 percent of GDP. The cost would be larger if 
benefits were set at a higher level, such as (in the less-poor countries) 30 percent 
of GDP per capita. Alternative child benefit programmes were costed at between 
1 and 4.5 percent of GDP, with the cheapest programmes covering only double 
orphans. Pal et al. also costed a targeted grant to the poorest 10 percent of 
households, with benefits of just under US$14/household/month (modelled on 
an experimental cash transfer programme in Zambia). The cost of this would 
vary from 0.15 percent to a high of 0.7 percent of GDP (with the proportional 
cost being highest in the poorest countries, i.e. Ethiopia and Tanzania).8  
 
                                                          
7 These programmes were costed as part of a larger social protection package that included 
also basic health care and education, which were very much more expensive. Pal et al. also 
costed administrative overheads at 15 percent of benefits. A separate study costed similar 
programmes in five South Asian countries. A further study was envisaged of selected 
countries in Latin America. 
8 Pal et al. costed administrative overheads at 15 percent of benefits. Pal et al. also costed 
basic health care and education, which would require very much larger expenditures. 
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The ILO’s costing for the African cases was updated and extended in 2008 
(ILO, 2008a).9 The updated analysis costed the following programmes (together 
with administrative costs): 
 
1. An old-age pension programme, set at 30 percent of GDP per capita 
(on the basis of a Tanzanian study of the cost of living), with a maximum 
of US$ 1/day (adjusted for purchasing power), paid to all men and women 
above the age of 65; together with a disability pension programme paying 
the same benefits to 1 percent of the working age population; the total 
cost varied between 0.6 percent and 1.5 percent of GDP. 
2. Basic child benefits, set at 15 percent of GDP per capita, with a 
maximum of US$ 0.50/day (PPP), payable for each of two children to the 
age of fourteen, to the mother; the total cost varied between 1.5 percent 
and 3.5 percent of GDP. 
3. Social assistance to un- or underemployed working-age adults 
through workfare, along the lines of the Indian National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme, that guaranteed low-wage work for 100 
days p.a. per household; the ILO assumed that the programme would need 
to reach 10 percent of the working-age population (excluding households 
benefitting from either old-age pensions or child benefits); benefits would 
be set at 30 percent of GDP per capita, with a maximum of US$1/day 
(PPP); the cost would vary between 0.3 percent and 0.8 percent of GDP. 
The ILO team also costed basic, universal health care.  
 
Soon after these, a third international agency – UNICEF, in conjunction with the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in the UK – conducted a set of studies of 
the costs of (and possible financing options for) child benefits and old-age 
pensions in five west and central African cases (Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ghana, Mali, Senegal) (Handley, 2009).10 Three cash transfer programmes were 
costed: 
 
 A universal child benefit: Payable for all children to the age of 14, 
with benefits set at 30 percent of the extreme (food) poverty line; the 
cost would be a modest 0.9 percent and 2 percent of GDP in oil-rich 
Equatorial Guinea and Congo respectively, but would be between 
about 6 percent of GDP in each of Mali and Senegal, and a massive 9 
percent of GDP in Ghana.  
 A targeted child benefit: Payable for all children to the age of 14, 
with benefits set at 30 percent of the extreme (food) poverty line (as 
                                                          
9 The authors were Behrendt and Hagemeyer. 
10 The costing studies were undertaken by various authors: Notten et al on Congo, Barrientos 
and Bossavie on Mali and Senegal, Barrientos on Equatorial Guinea and Ghana. 
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with the universal child benefit), but only for children in households 
below the poverty line; this would cost just over one half of the 
universal child benefit option. 
 An old-age pension programme: Payable to men and women above 
the age of 60, with benefits set at 70 percent of the poverty line; in the 
Equatorial Guinea this would cost a paltry 0.2 percent of GDP, and in 
the Congo it would cost only 1 percent of GDP; in Ghana, it would 
cost 2.6 percent of GDP (and it was not costed in either Mali or 
Senegal).  
 
Administrative costs were assumed to be 10 percent for the universal 
programmes and 15 percent for the targeted one. The UNICEF study discussed 
in some detail the fiscal space in each country for these kinds of programmes. 
 
These UNICEF costs were very much higher than the ILO’s. For Senegal – 
which was the only country in both studies – UNICEF costed the universal child 
benefit at 6.4 percent of GDP, and the means-tested child benefit at 3.7 percent 
of GDP, whereas the ILO costed the universal child benefit component of the 
‘basic social protection package’ at 2.3 percent of GDP in 2005 (dropping to 1 
percent over time) (Pal et al., 2005: 24). The reason for this presumably lay in 
the level of the benefit: 30 percent of the national poverty line (as used by 
UNICEF) must have been much more generous than the US$0.25/day (PPP) 
(used in the ILO studies). 
 
Since the mid-2000s there have been numerous studies of the costs of cash 
transfer programmes in individual countries. In Senegal, for example, a child 
benefit programme was costed at 1.7 percent of GDP by Samson & Cherrier 
(2009, cited by Schnitzer, 2011). Schnitzer (2011), however, assessed that 
Samson & Cherrier’s proposals were “likely not to be affordable in the current 
situation of recovery from the economic crisis and likely fiscal readjustment and 
budget austerity in the few years to come” (2011: 18). A more modest 
programme was more realistic, and could be funded through reallocating 
resources spent on food and fuel subsidies, which cost 3 percent of GDP (and 
benefitted primarily the non-poor). Schnitzer costed a child grant programme 
limited to the fifteen poorest districts at 0.55 percent of GDP. In Tanzania, to 
take another example, ILO researchers costed universal pensions in 2006 and 
2008, going into much more detail than in the multi-country studies conducted 
in 2005 and 2008 (ILO, 2006, 2008c). In 2010, both the UK-based NGO 
HelpAge Internatonal and the local (Tanzanian) NGO REPOA costed universal 
pensions, examining the cost implications of different age thresholds and benefit 
levels. HelpAge (2010) costed different versions at between 0.26 and 1.28 
percent of GDP, whilst REPOA (2010) costed their versions at between 1.1 and 
2.3 percent. 
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The costs of existing programmes 
 
As more programmes were initiated across Africa, more data slowly became 
available on actual costs. O’Cleirigh (from Irish Aid, in a report for the OECD) 
referred to the PSNP in Ethiopia, which targeted the 10 percent of households 
that were most food-insecure in the long-term, at a cost of 1.7 percent of GDP. 
O’Cleirigh also pointed to the experience of a five-month long district-specific 
feeding programme in Malawi. Scaling up the programme to cover the 6 percent 
of households experiencing food insecurity across Malawi as a whole would 
cost 0.5 percent of GDP. Expanding the programme to the poorest 10 percent of 
households for the entire year would cost 1.8 percent of GDP (O’Cleirigh, 
2009). Garcia & Moore (2012: 175-8, for the World Bank) collated data on 
more than one hundred cash transfer programmes across Africa. Most were still 
in pilot stages, and the costs were generally negligible. The larger programmes – 
such as the PSNP in Ethiopia, and universal old-age pension programmes in 
Namibia and Lesotho (as well as in South Africa) – cost more than 1 percent of 
GDP. Programmes that paid more modest benefits – such as old-age pensions in 
Botswana – generally cost less (although the South African child grant, payable 
to most children to the age of eighteen, cost more than 1 percent of GDP). 
 
The experience of actual programmes revealed the complexities of cost. The 
World Bank tends to favour targeted programmes in part on the basis that they 
are more affordable. The ILO favours less generous universal programmes. In 
the mid-2000s, however, South Africa’s means-tested old-age pension scheme 
cost just over 1.2 percent of GDP,11 whereas Botswana’s universal12 pension 
cost about one-fifth of this in relation to GDP.13 These cases remind us that costs 
depend on benefit levels as well as eligibility conditions: South Africa’s pension 





From the outset, even the ILO recognized that anything approaching a ‘basic 
social protection package’ would be beyond the means of most low-income 
countries on their own, although the reallocation of domestic resources would go 
                                                          
11 As we shall see below, the old-age pension was then paid to women from the age of 60 but 
to men from the age of 65. Later, the age of eligibility for men was lowered to remove this 
discrimination. The cost of the programme rose marginally. 
12 From age 65. 
13 PensionWatch report that, in 2010, the cost was 0.26% of GDP. 
14 In 2010 the pension benefit was US$56 per month in purchasing power. By contrast, the 
pension in South Africa was worth US$248 per month in purchasing power. See 
PensionWatch database. 
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a long way). Pal et al.’s calculations showed that external financing would need 
to account for the lion’s share of expenditure on their most ambitious proposals. 
The 2008 ILO report reiterated this: 
 
‘The projections show that introducing a complete package of basic 
social security benefits requires a level of resources that is higher than 
current spending in the majority of low-income countries (which 
rarely spend more than 3 per cent of GDP on health care and rarely 
more than 1 per cent of GDP on non-health social security measures). 
Therefore, a considerable joint domestic and international effort is 
needed to invest in basic social protection to bring about significant 
social development and a sharp reduction of poverty’ (ILO, 2008a: 
11). 
 
Pal et al. (2005: xii) emphasized, however, that “a basic social protection benefit 
package can be affordable if it is made a priority area of national policy”, i.e. if 
governments reallocated expenditure to social protection. “If the national 
commitment exists and one third of total government expenditure can be 
reallocated to meet basic social protection needs then the necessity for 
international financing would show a steady decline in the medium-term” (2005: 
41). The 2008 ILO study pointed to the possibilities of funding health care in 
part through a contributory programme (along the lines of Ghana’s National 
Health Insurance system) and in part through debt financing, with donor support 
to fill any ensuing gaps. The ILO concluded that they had shown that “a basic 
social protection package is demonstrably affordable”, but  
 
‘on condition that the package is implemented through the joint efforts 
of the low-income countries themselves (reallocating existing 
resources and raising new resources, i.e. through health insurance or 
other earmarked sources of financing for social security) and of the 
international donor community – which would in some cases have to 
refocus international grants on the supplementary direct financing of 
social protection benefits, on strengthening the administrative and 
delivery capacity of national social protection institutions in low-
income countries and on providing the necessary technical advice and 
other support’ (ILO, 2008a: 18). 
 
In 2006, the ILO calculated that it would cost less than 2 percent of global GDP 
to provide basic benefits to all of the world’s poor (cited in ILO, 2008a: 3). 
 
Other studies were less sanguine than the ILO. The UNICEF study showed that 
some countries – notably oil-producing Congo and Equatorial Guinea – had 
substantial available resources, although their governments chose to spend very 
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little on social protection. ‘Affordability’ was ‘more of a problem’ in the other, 
‘aid-dependent’ countries (Handley, 2009). O’Cleirigh noted that both domestic 
tax revenues and donor aid were rising, and concluded that “the levels and 
trends of revenue growth would seem to imply that financial affordability should 
not be a binding constraint to financing modest but significant social protection 
programmes” (2009: 121, emphasis added). 
 
The clearest warning came from Hagen-Zanker & McCord (2010), in a report 
for the ODI in the UK. They noted that African governments would need to 
balance spending on social protection (narrowly-defined in terms of income 
support) with spending on other pressing priorities. Most African governments 
had formally endorsed a set of spending targets covering health, education, 
sanitation, agriculture and rural development, and infrastructure, in addition to 
social protection (as shown in Hagen-Zanker & McCord’s Table 1, below; from 
2010: 9). If governments are spending below other targets, then social protection 




Hagen-Zanker & McCord examined what these would mean for five African 
countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda). Using data 
from 2006-07 (which predated some of the spending targets listed above), 
Hagen-Zanker & McCord found that three of their five countries’ governments 
met the targets with respect to education spending, only two did so with respect 
to agriculture and only one did so with respect to health. None came close to the 
targets for social protection, water and sanitation or infrastructure (see their 
Table 3, p13). Hagen-Zanker & McCord extended their analysis to include ‘off-
budget’ official development assistance (ODA) – i.e. ODA not recorded in data 
on government expenditure15 – for two of their cases (Malawi and Uganda). In 
Malawi, off-budget donor aid pushed aggregate spending on health and 
agriculture even further above the target, and raised spending on education and 
water/sanitation close to the target. Social protection remained far below the 
                                                          
15 Government expenditure including government-recorded ODA came to between 20 and 27 
percent of GDP in their five cases. I estimate (on the basis of the data reported by Hagen-
Zanker and McCord) that ‘off-budget’ ODA constituted as much as another 10 percent of 
GDP in Uganda and perhaps even more in Malawi. 
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target, as did infrastructure. In Uganda, off-budget ODA made little difference, 
and even aggregate spending remained below-target in all six categories. 
Certainly in Uganda and probably in Malawi, social protection faced stiff 
competition from other sectors for resources. The intensity of this competition is 
evident from Hagen-Zanker & McCord’s calculations of how big an increase in 
spending would be required to meet all of the targets. Even if all government 
expenditure was reallocated to these six expenditure categories, only one of their 
five countries (Kenya) could meet the targets (2010: 18).  
 
The World Bank’s response has generally been to emphasise the possibilities of 
reallocating existing public expenditure as well as harnessing the resources 
becoming available because of economic growth. In 2012, the World Bank 
pointed to low levels of expenditure on social protection across most (but not 
all) of Africa, but insisted that “achieving national coverage” was “fiscally 
affordable”. Economic growth was expanding the ‘fiscal space’, domestic 
resources could be shifted from other programmes – especially from poorly-
targeted (and often distortionary) general price subsidies (which, in the case of 
Senegal, cost 3-4 percent of GDP in the late 2000s), and donor funding could 
continue to play an important role (World Bank 2012a, 2012b). 
 
As the World Bank itself acknowledged, however, there was a clear political 
challenge: 
  
‘Increasing policymakers’ awareness of the links between social 
protection and economic growth will be imperative for building 
political coalitions in support of social protection funding, by 
overcoming concerns that social protection promotes dependency. In 
other countries, a case should be made for increasing financing for 
social protection as a means of realizing the constitutional rights of 
citizens, such as in Kenya and South Africa’ (World Bank, 2012a: 4). 
 
The World Bank recognized that policymakers in low-income countries in 
Africa and elsewhere would not prioritise (or support at all) social protection if 
they saw transfers as ‘handouts’. This pointed to the imperative of countering 
such perceptions with evidence of the developmental benefits of social 
protection. The World Bank also recognized that, politically, more spending was 
not always productive: Social protection expenditure “should be focused on 
efficient and effective programs that have been evaluated, proven to be 
effective, and then scaled up”, with programme benefits set at ‘affordable’ levels 





Revisiting affordability in the 2010s 
 
The international agencies’ approach to the affordability of social protection 
shifted from 2009, in response to two main factors. First, the global economic 
crisis pushed diverse organisations to embrace more fully a ‘social protection 
agenda’. Various UN agencies agreed to the ILO’s proposal to launch a Social 
Protection Floor Initiative as one of nine UN joint initiatives to cope with the 
effects of the economic crisis. In 2010, the ILO published a report on Extending 
Social Security to All: A guide through challenges and options (as well as a 
once-off World Social Security Report). The Social Protection Floor Advisory 
Group (chaired by former Chilean president, Michele Bachelet) recommended in 
2011 that countries adopt social protection floors, although the Group 
acknowledged that there was no template that would suit all contexts. The 
following year, the ILO adopted Recommendation #202 on Social Protection 
Floors. The World Bank also restated its case for social protection – including in 
Africa (see World Bank, 2012a, 2012b). Whilst the ILO and World Bank 
differed in their priorities, both endorsed the expansion of social protection. 
 
Both the ILO and the World Bank renewed their efforts to demonstrate that 
social protection was affordable.16 As part of its preparations for its 2014/15 
World Social Protection Report, the ILO costed a universal child benefit 
programme in more than fifty low- and middle-income countries using 
standardized criteria. The ILO costed a programme paying benefits set at 12 
percent of the national poverty line (this being the average ratio in Europe) for 
non-orphaned children up to age 18, together with more generous benefits for 
double orphans (set at the poverty line) and modest administrative costs. The 
average cost would be 1.9 percent of GDP (using an arithmetic average for 57 
countries, or 0.9 percent using a weighted average). The cost was higher in 
countries with higher poverty, a higher poverty line or more children in the 
population. In one-third of their overall set of countries, the cost would be less 
than 1 percent of GDP. This sub-set included only two African countries, 
however (Cape Verde and Ghana). The projected cost exceeded 3 percent for 
only one in five countries in the global set, but these included many African 
countries, especially in West Africa, and also Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi and 
Mozambique. These costings did not adjust for savings on existing programmes, 
but these were unlikely to be significant (ILO, 2015a). The World Bank began 
to publish its own annual review of “the state of social safety nets” in 2014, with 
the explicit goal of disseminating data and analysis to guide policy-making. In 
its 2015 State of Social Safety Nets, the World Bank proclaimed boldly and 
                                                          
16 On 30 June 2015 the World Bank and ILO put out a joint statement ‘calling the attention of 
world leaders to the importance of universal social protection policies and financing’. 
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unambiguously that “safety nets are affordable at all levels of income” (World 
Bank, 2015: 21). 
 
The second shift in the 2010s was a growing focus on revenues as much as 
costs. A series of studies considered fiscal space in selected countries. For 
example, Handley (2009) examined fiscal space in five West and Central 
African countries, showing that some (especially the oil-rich ones) clearly had 
ample fiscal space for new social programmes, but some other countries faced 
tougher challenges. In another example, Aguzzoni (2011) examined fiscal space 
in Zambia for the ILO, three years after the ILO’s detailed costing of social 
protection programmes there. Gough & Abu Sharkh (2011) conducted cluster 
analysis on the composition of public revenues for a set of 59 developing 
countries, distinguishing between clusters on the basis of whether countries 
relied primarily on domestic taxation, social security contributions, aid or other 
revenues, or had no dominant source of revenue. Most of their African cases 
were either tax-dependent or aid-dependent. 
 
In 2015, the ILO’s Ortiz et al. collated evidence on fiscal space in a large 
number of middle- and low-income countries. “The argument that spending on 
social protection is unaffordable is becoming less common in international 
development forums”, they stated at the outset: “Finding fiscal space for critical 
economic and social investments is necessary for inclusive growth as well as for 
sustained human development, particularly during downtimes” (ILO, 2015b: 1). 
Ortiz et al. discussed eight mechansisms for expanding the fiscal space for 
social protection. These included: the re-allocation of public expenditures from 
“areas with limited development returns”, for example from military expenditure 
to health (as in Costa Rica and Thailand); increasing tax revenues, as in Brazil 
(which had introduced a financial transactions tax) and Bolivia and Mongolia 
(which used mining and gas revenues); expanding social security coverage and 
contributory revenues, as in much of Latin America; and lobbying for additional 
aid and transfers.17 Additional mechanisms included the elimination of illicit 
financial flows, using fiscal and foreign exchange reserves, borrowing or 
restructuring existing debt and adopting a more accommodative macroeconomic 
framework. Ortiz et al. collated basic data on fiscal space for middle and low-
income countries, revealing whether each country was collecting little tax or 
spending a lot on the military. Unfortunately, key fiscal data were unavailable 
for a number of countries. Their conclusion was clear: Even the poorest 
countries had the fiscal space to expand social protection for the poor. 
 
                                                          
17 O’Cleirigh (2009) noted that the cost of universal social protection was a small fraction of 
the total aid flowing into many countries. 
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Analyses of fiscal space suggested that, in the words of the then Director-
General of the ILO (Juan Somavia), “the world does not lack the resources to 
abolish poverty, it only lacks the right priorities”.18 Taxation is, of course, as 
political as public expenditure, although often in different ways. The growing 
attention paid to taxes and fiscal space generally prompted pioneering studies of 
the political economy of taxation, for example by UNRISD with respect to 
Uganda (including Kjaer & Ulriksen, 2014). 
 
 
Case-studies of the political economy of 
affordability in Africa 
 
The second half of this paper examines four case-studies of the political 
economy of affordability in Africa. In each case, there appears to be an 
‘affordability gap’ between international agencies and aid donors, advocating 
expanded social protection and claiming that there was fiscal space, and 
domestic political elites who expressed anxiety about ‘affordability’, perhaps 
because they did not really buy into the whole idea of social protection. The first 
case-study is Botswana, where for several decades the political elite expressed 
ambivalence about social protection at the same time as they gradually expanded 
it. The second case-study is of South Africa, where the African National 
Congress-led government inherited in 1994 an extensive welfare state, but then 
had to decide whether and how to reform it. The final two case-studies are of 
low-income countries. In Zambia, the government resisted pressure to expand 
social protection in the mid-2000s, before a more populist government agreed to 
modest reforms after 2011. In Zanzibar, in 2016, the government introduced 
universal old-age pensions, albeit only from the age of 70 and with modest 





Botswana has experienced exceptional economic growth since independence in 
1966, lifting the country from being one of the poorest countries in the world to 
a middle-income economy. By 2008, GDP per capita was fourteen times higher 
in real terms than it had been at independence, and was much the same as in its 
affluent neighbor, South Africa. Growth was fueled primarily by the rapid 
expansion of mining, from the early 1970s. Mining fueled also the rapid growth 
of government revenue and public expenditure, as a result of the government’s 
shrewd and public-spirited negotiations with mining companies. Economic 
                                                          
18 Social Protection Floor website. 
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growth made possible the expansion and institutionalization of a welfare state. 
The fact that the benefits of growth were not shared across the whole population 
also provided strong impetus towards remedial state interventions. Through the 
first five decades following independence, however, government ministers 
repeatedly spoke out against ‘dependency’ on ‘handouts’. The government 
regularly expressed concern over the affordability of its welfare programmes, 
the cost of which (less than 2 percent of GDP in the 2010s) is much less than in 
South Africa or Mauritius (although it is more than in most lower-income 
African countries). The construction of a welfare state in Botswana is a story of 
fiscal and programmatic expansion despite the generally conservative attitude of 
its governments, which explains why the welfare state has distinctly 
conservative features (Seekings, 2016c). 
 
The fiscal expansion of the welfare state in Botswana entailed a series of phases, 
reflecting in part the fiscal space as perceived by the government. The first 
phase entailed large-scale drought relief and then post-drought recovery 
programmes in the mid- and late 1960s. The Bechuanaland (later Botswana) 
Democratic Party (BDP) won elections in early 1965 and proceeded to form a 
government, with Seretse Khama as Prime Minister. At independence, in 
September 1966, Khama became president of the new Republic of Botswana. 
This took place in the middle of the worst drought in many decades. Faced with 
the prospect of famine and the devastation of cattle herds, the newly-elected 
government was compelled to provide drought relief – even though it had no 
money. At independence, grants from the British government funded more than 
one half of the government of Botswana’s recurrent expenditure and all of its 
developmental expenditure. Expenditure was ‘acutely constrained by a shortage 
of funds’ (Colclough & McCarthy, 1980: 85). The drought relief and recovery 
programme was made possible – and its design shaped – by the availability of 
large volumes of free food (and even stockfeed) through the new World Food 
Programme (WFP). Between mid-1965 and mid-1969 the WFP spent 
approximately $15 million on Botswana, which was about one half of the total 
domestic revenues (i.e. excluding grants from the UK) of the government of 
Bechuanaland/Botswana over this period.19 The cost of the drought relief and 
recovery operation ran at about 2 percent of GDP at this time (Stevens, 1978), 
but was nonetheless far beyond the current fiscal capacity of the government of 
Botswana. The fact that almost all WFP aid was provided in kind – as food or 
stockfeed – reinforced the preference for in kind benefits within the new 
political elite, with lasting implications for the design of the welfare state in 
Botswana.  
                                                          
19 The total WFP expenditure over 1965-69 is calculated from data provided by the WFP (see 
Seekings, 2016a: Appendix 1). The exchange rate at the time was about R0.7:$1 (according to 
World Development Indicators). The domestic revenues of the government of Botswana were 
about R6-7m p.a. at this time (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980: 80). 
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The second phase of welfare state-building in Botswana was based on further 
drought relief and recovery programmes over the following twenty-five years. 
Drought recurred in 1979-80, through most of the mid-1980s, and again in the 
early 1990s.  In contrast to the 1960s, however, the government of Botswana 
enjoyed rapidly growing domestic revenues. In the late 1960s the government’s 
fiscal priority was to raise additional revenues to free it from dependence on 
grants provided by the UK (and hence the necessity of securing British approval 
of all additional expenditures). Expatriate technocrats helped to renegotiate the 
terms of the Southern African Customs Union, resulting in a large increase in 
customs revenues; income tax revenues also grew rapidly. Domestic revenues 
rose fourfold (in current prices) between 1968/69 and 1972/73, by when the 
recurrent budget was balanced and did not require British subvention (Colclough 
& McCarthy, 1980). Despite improved public finances and economic growth, 
the WFP continued to provide substantial food aid, through both regular feeding 
programmes (especially in schools) and emergency relief during and after 
drought.  
 
Although a large part of the total cost of welfare provision – between 1 and 3 
percent of GDP – continued to be borne by the WFP, the government of 
Botswana did have to make occasional decisions about their financial 
commitments. The government assumed almost all the non-food costs of relief 
and recovery programmes. In 1984, during chronic drought, Botswana received 
about 31 million Pula in food aid (mostly from the WFP) and actually spent 
about P27 million, almost of which came from domestic revenues (Holm & 
Morgan, 1985: 476). The total cost came to about 3 percent of GDP, divided 
approximately equally between donors and the government of Botswana. 
Outside of droughts, the government incurred costs in running feeding 
programmes (although the food itself came from abroad) and for ‘destitute’ 
relief, but the latter at least was very inexpensive. Destitute relief served, like the 
poor laws in nineteenth century Europe, to mitigate extreme poverty, but the 
government looked primarily to economic growth and agricultural programmes 
to reduce poverty.  
 
In the second half of the 1990s, the subsidization of the welfare state through the 
WFP (as well as development aid from the UK and elsewhere) largely dried up. 
Some foreign aid continued: The US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) funded Botswana’s Orphan and Child Programme until 2013. 
In general, however, it was during this period that the government of Botswana 
assumed financial responsibility for programmes hitherto funded externally 
(especially the feeding programmes) and introduced new programmes (such as 
the old age pension) even though the cost was borne entirely by the government 
itself. Both of these reforms entailed significant additional financial 
commitments. Firstly, the new old-age pensions cost almost P100 million, or 0.5 
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percent of GDP, in 1997-98. The cost in relation to GDP declined subsequently, 
to about 0.2 percent, because the real value of the pension was not increased 
whilst the GDP continued to grow. It is likely that the government anticipated 
this when it decided to introduce the pensions. Secondly, the government 
assumed full responsibility for the feeding programmes. Outside of drought (and 
drought recovery) years, the cost of feeding programmes was modest. In 
1997/98, the government spent only P42 million or 0.2 percent of GDP, 
although expenditure rose subsequently to about 0.5 percent of GDP during the 
drought of the early 2000s. Although the government’s detailed financial 
projections do not seem to be public, the government probably anticipated that 
these two reforms would cost it close to 1 percent of GDP. This level of 
expenditure would have been a massive outlay for many African countries, but 
for Botswana it was less than was being spent on drought relief and recovery 
programmes for much of the time. It was also deemed affordable given the 
apparently healthy condition of public finances. The expansion of mining had, 
thanks to a shrewdly-negotiated deal with De Beers, resulted in a massive 
increase in government revenues from the 1970s. At the time that the 
government was considering the old-age pension and the feeding programmes, it 
was projecting continued budget surpluses. The 8th National Development Plan 
(NDP, for the years 1997/98-2002/03) forecast that rising revenues would 
continue to outpace rising expenditure (although the NDP did warn that a 
combination of slower-than-forecast economic growth and unrestrained public 
expenditure would result in budget deficits, and hence slower growth – 
Botswana, 1997a: 69-71). Quett Masire, who served as Khama’s vice-president 
and Minister of Finance and Development Planning, had been said to be “thrifty 
to the point of being miserly”, according to fellow-BDP leader David Magang; 
after Masire succeeded Khama as president (in 1980), “there dawned the era of 
freebies, which included literally free, throwaway money” (Magang, 2008: 475).  
 
In the late 1990s, as Masire handed over the presidency to his deputy, Festus 
Mogae, the budget slid into unanticipated crisis. Economic growth was better 
than expected but public expenditure rose so fast that the government incurred a 
massive budget deficit of P1.4 billion or more than 6 percent of GDP in 
1998/99. This was the first budget deficit since 1982/83 (when the deficit had 
been about a modest 2 percent of GDP). Deficits recurred also in 2001/02 and 
2002/03, as expenditure continued to rise whilst revenues in fact declined 
(Botswana, 2003: 35-39). Increased domestic funding of welfare programmes in 
the late 1990s contributed to these budget deficits, although rising expenditure 
was driven primarily by the public sector wage bill. In response, the government 
introduced VAT in July 2002, and proposed ‘cost recovery’ for public services. 
 
This fiscal crisis formed the backdrop for the fourth phase of welfare state-
building in Botswana, in the early 2000s. The government agreed to a series of 
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mostly parametric reforms that raised the total costs of its social assistance 
programmes to close to 2 percent of GDP despite economic growth. The value 
of food baskets was raised, and workfare was expanded. But the government 
rejected proposals for two expensive reforms: for a Child Support Grant which 
would have cost 1.2 percent of GDP, in 2010, and for a Family Support Grant 
costing up to 0.35 percent of GDP, three years later. This was a period of 
renewed anxiety over the cost of welfare programmes. Public finances had 
recovered in the early 2000s after the unprecedented budget deficit of 1998/99. 
The global economic crisis of 2008-09 caused commodity process to crash, 
however, which meant that the government of Botswana’s revenues from 
mining collapsed. The 10th NDP (2009-16) budgeted for deficits, and warned 
that it would be difficult to maintain safety nets (Botswana, 2009: 46). The need 
for fiscal caution was restated in 2013 in the mid-term review of the 10th NDP 
(Botswana, 2013b).20 
 
Fiscal considerations were clearly important in this process of policy reform. 
Large-scale drought relief and recovery programmes could be adopted at the 
time of independence in large part because most of the cost was shouldered by 
the WFP. Improved public finances (together with continued support from the 
WFP through to the 1990s) enabled the subsequent institutionalization of these 
programmes, eventually at the expense of the government of Botswana alone, 
and their expansion through the old-age pension and other programmes. The 
fiscal crisis of 1998-2002 and the later global economic crisis from 2008 both 
heightened fiscal anxiety, prompting government to reject proposals for 
expensive reforms.  
 
Botswana’s welfare programmes evolved very consistently, despite these 
changes over time in their perceived affordability. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, Khama, Masire and the BDP developed a welfare doctrine that justified 
the state’s provision of relief, primarily in the face of drought but also taking 
into account the erosion of ‘traditional’ norms of extra-state support by kin or 
within the ‘community’, with benefits at a minimal level, often in kind rather 
than cash, and generally to families rather than individuals. This doctrine 
reflected political conditions, with the elected government assuming roles 
previously played by hereditary chiefs and the BDP securing its support base in 
rural areas against the threat posed by competing political parties (Seekings, 
2016b). Subsequent reforms to the welfare state were generally incremental. The 
most dramatic reform – the introduction of old-age pensions – represented the 
modernization of the existing and insufficient system of relief for ‘destitutes’. 
The government’s over-optimistic assessment of public finances allowed it to 
                                                          
20 Isaac Chinyoka tells me that the anxiety over the sustainability of social assistance is rooted 
in the fear that diamonds are not forever. This point is also made by President Ian Khama in 
an interview by Greg Mills, Daily Maverick, 29th June 2016. 
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introduce a programme that would cost about 0.5 percent of GDP, but the cost 
was contained by setting benefits at a level that was very parsimonious relative 
to neighbouring South Africa (where the old-age pension programme therefore 
cost three times as much in relation to GDP). The other similarly ‘expensive’ 
reform was the government’s assumption of responsibility for the school and 
other feeding programmes hitherto supported by the WFP. The government 
rejected more expensive reform proposals.  
 
 
The Child Support Grant in South Africa21 
 
When South Africa democratized in the early 1990s it was already a middle-
income economy with an extensive set of cash transfer programmes, although 
the apartheid-era National Party government had repeatedly insisted that the 
country did not have a ‘welfare state’. The decline of subsistence agriculture in 
South Africa meant that drought ceased to be a significant cause of poverty. 
From the 1930s and 1940s – i.e. almost half a century earlier than in Botswana – 
the ‘deserving poor’ in South Africa were seen to comprise individuals who 
were too old, too infirm or too young to work. South Africa’s welfare system 
was originally established to privilege white citizens, but over time had been 
expanded to cover the black majority. The government led by the African 
National Congress (ANC) therefore inherited in 1994 a social protection system 
that provided generous non-contributory pensions to the elderly (costing 1.5 
percent of GDP in 1994/95) and disabled (costing 0.5 percent of GDP), as well 
as grants to some single mothers with children (costing 0.2 percent of GDP).  
 
After 1994, the ANC government’s reforms were largely ‘parametric’, i.e. they 
concerned the parameters of benefit levels and eligibility conditions of existing 
programmes, rather than entirely new programmes (see Seekings & Nattrass, 
2015: Chapter 6). The age of eligibility for old-age pensions was reduced to 
sixty years for men, i.e. to the same level as for women. Access to disability 
grants was first made easier, then tightened. Access to all pensions and grants 
was extended to legally resident non-citizens. The level of benefits paid under 
most programmes changed little in real terms (i.e. taking inflation into account). 
Public employment programmes were expanded, and benefits increased.  
 
Only one programme experienced dramatic reform: The democratic government 
replaced the ‘state maintenance grant’ (SMG) it inherited from the apartheid 
state with a new ‘child support grant’ (CSG), and subsequently raised the age 
threshold at which children ceased to be eligible. This was a parametric reform 
in the sense that it entailed changes to the level of the benefit and the conditions 
                                                          
21 This section is based on Seekings (2016d). 
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of eligibility. It was dramatic in the sense that it led to a massive increase in the 
number of beneficiaries and a significant increase in real expenditure. In the 
mid-1990s, the SMG was paid out for only about 200,000 children, at a cost of 
about 0.2 percent of GDP. Almost none of these beneficiaries were black (or 
African). In the mid-2010s, the CSG was paid out for about 12 million children, 
at a cost of about 1.3 percent of GDP, making it one of a small number of social 
assistance programmes in the global South that cost more than 1 percent of 
GDP. 
 
The government of South Africa never decided to spend an additional 1 or more 
percent of GDP on this or any other social assistance programme. Rather, the 
process of introducing and later expanding the CSG entailed at least six distinct 
episodes of reform. In 1995-96, a government-appointed commission was tasked 
with recommending whether to abolish the existing SMG, to expand access to 
all South Africans (which would have cost 2 percent of GDP), or to reform it, 
scaling back benefits whilst expanding access with the result that the overall cost 
remained unchanged (at about 0.2 percent of GDP). The Commission 
recommended the third option. During deliberations over the recommendation, 
however, both benefits and access were improved somewhat, pushing the cost 
up by an additional 0.2 percent of GDP. In 2002-03, another official commission 
recommended that the means-test be abolished and/or the age threshold raised, 
which would have cost an additional 1.6 percent of GDP. The government 
rejected most of this proposal, instead raising the age threshold modestly at an 
additional cost of only 0.4 percent of GDP. In 2005-08, the age-limit was again 
discussed. In the face of proposals that would have cost an additional 0.4 percent 
of GDP, the government again proceeded cautiously, raising the age threshold 
only enough to cost an additional 0.1 percent of GDP. In 2008-09, the 
government reformed the means-test (at a cost of 0.1 percent of GDP) and then 
raised the age threshold once more, at a cost of 0.4 percent of GDP. 
 
Political pressures pushed the government to expand this programme 
incrementally. ‘Affordability’ was a constraint at times, but not at others. 
Overall, its effect remains unclear. The initial cautious recommendation (in 
1995-96) and the modest revision of benefits and age threshold (in 1997-98) 
occurred against the backdrop of fiscal crisis, as the budget deficit and 
government debt spiraled out of control. In these episodes, the fiscal context 
appears to have been a constraint on expansion. The following two episodes of 
reform – i.e. the expansions of 2002-03 and 2005-08 – occurred against the 
backdrop of strong public finances, with revenues rising rapidly, the deficit 
shifting to surplus, and government debt declining in relation to GDP. Yet these 
expansions were only a little more generous than the reforms in the preceding 
period of austerity. Healthy public finances in the 2000s did not lead to 
profligacy; expensive reforms were rejected. The two final episodes of reform – 
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i.e. the expansions of 2008-09 – occurred against the backdrop of growing 
budget deficits but still low levels of government debt. Despite the partial 
deterioration in public finances, the expansions of 2008-09 cost in total as much 
as the expansions in the preceding period of fiscal boom. There is no clear 
correlation between fiscal space and policy reform.  
 
The pattern of steady but non-linear expansion reflected political conditions. 
The government could reject bold and expensive reform proposals because it 
faced little external pressure, and the dominant ideology within the ANC was 
skeptical about ‘handouts’ to working-age adults, even if the adults in question 
were young mothers or other caregivers who were caring for children.22 At the 
same time, the CSG had political champions within the ANC (especially a wily 
Minister of Social Development), and cautious expansion made political sense 
in the context of enduring poverty and rising inequality that threatened to 





Zambia was the first country in East or central Africa to experiment with a cash 
transfer programme but ten years later donor-funded pilot programmes had not 
been scaled up significantly. Up to 2011, the government resisted cash transfers 
in part on the grounds of unaffordability. A change of government in 2011 
resulted in more support for policy reforms, but only limited reforms were 
actually implemented. Given the pressures on public finances in Zambia, 
affordability was a real concern. But, especially until 2011, it also masked a 
deeper ideological hostility to ‘handouts’. 
 
The need for cash transfers in Zambia arose from the combination of drought 
(which intermittently devastated peasant agriculture) and AIDS (which resulted 
in rising numbers of ‘labour-constrained’ households comprising the elderly, 
sick people and children). In 2000, the government half-heartedly sought to 
resuscitate its Public Welfare Assistance Scheme, i.e. poor relief dating back to 
the colonial era. This came to naught, largely because neither the government 
nor donors was willing to fund a system of ‘handouts’. In the early 2000s, 
however, severe drought pushed donors into a massive emergency food relief 
operation. Some of the donors decided that they should address the underlying 
vulnerability that made people susceptible to drought rather than provide endless 
                                                          
22 One reform that was unambiguously not parametric was proposed (including by a 
government-appointed commission of inquiry) but rejected (by the government): A basic 
income grant, that would have been payable to all adults and children, including especially 
adults of working age. 
23 The first part of this section is based on Kabandula and Seekings (2014). 
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food aid. In 2002, the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) funded a ‘Social Safety Net Project’ in the Ministry of Community 
Development an Social Services (MCDDSS), funded a study in 2003 of how it 
might support people who had been impoverished by AIDS, and then (in late 
2003) launched a pilot cash transfer scheme focused on ‘incapacitated’ – i.e. 
‘labour-scarce and destitute’ – households. By early 2004 the scheme was 
paying monthly benefits to just over one thousand households. 
 
The Kalomo scheme led to further pilot schemes, mostly funded by DfID). The 
purpose of the pilot schemes was primarily to generate the data needed to 
convince the Zambian government that cash transfers were possible and 
effective and would not have negative social effects. In other words, the pilot 
schemes were essentially an exercise in political advocacy. But they were an 
exercise that largely failed. From the outset it was clear that the donor-driven 
pilot programmes enjoyed limited support from the government. Even within the 
Department of Social Welfare (within the MCDSS), officials seem to have 
favoured food aid programmes over cash transfers. The Ministry of Finance 
blocked funds from the African Development Bank for a proposed child grant 
programme, and declined to make any contribution from domestic revenues.  
 
In the face of this deep ambivalence within the government, GTZ, DfID and 
other donors sought to collect evidence of the efficacy of their experimental cash 
transfer programmes. The Kalomo and later pilot programmes were subjected to 
more-and-more thorough monitoring and evaluation (Van Ufford et al., 2016). 
Donors pushed successfully for the establishment of a ‘sectoral advisory group’ 
for social protection, chaired by an MCDSS official, and bringing together 
government and donor/agency personnel. The government incorporated a 
rhetorical commitment to social protection in its Fifth National Development 
Plan, published in December 2005. Opening an African Union (AU) conference 
on social protection in Livingstone in 2006, Zambian president Levy 
Mwanawasa described social protection as a ‘basic human right’ and as 
affordable. But Mwanawasa’s own Minister of Finance, Ng’andu Magande, 
conspicuously stayed away from the AU’s Livingstone conference, and the 
Ministry of Finance continued to resist calls to scale up the pilot schemes. In 
practice, the government continued to prioritise infrastructural and other 
obviously developmental programmes. 
 
In 2005, the GTZ’s consultant estimated that extending the Kalomo scheme “to 
all of the 200,000 destitute households in Zambia” would cost about US$ 21 
million, which was “the equivalent of 5% of the annual foreign aid inflow, or 
0.5% of the Zambian GDP”. This was interpreted as showing that a countrywide 
scheme was affordable (Schubert, 2005x: 24). MCDSS bureaucrats were flown 
to a World Bank workshop on ‘mainstreaming’ social protection within poverty 
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reduction programmes. Growing support within the MCDSS resulted, in 2006-
07, in its adoption of an “implementation Framework for Scaling up a National 
System on Cash Transfer”, providing for a ‘road map’ for rolling out social cash 
transfers to more and more districts, culminating in complete country-wide 
coverage by the end of 2012 (Chiwele, 2010: 48). 
 
But the government remained unconvinced. A “nationally agreed 
implementation plan” was needed before any roll-out could begin (quoted in 
Chiwele, 2010: 6), and an implementation plan could not be agreed until there 
was more evidence of the efficacy and affordability of cash transfers. DfID and 
GTZ funded more research, as well as study tours to South Africa and Lesotho, 
and radio and television programmes within Zambia. In a report for DfID, 
Hickey et al. concluded that  
 
‘the current regime cannot be described as particularly pro-poor and 
the current Minister of Finance has repeatedly stated that poverty does 
not exist, that “poor people” are simply lazy, and that policy should 
focus on wealth creation than poverty reduction. This fits the 
prevailing political discourse that tends to favour the “productive” 
segment of the population’ (2009: 21). 
 
Cash transfers might “have received favourable mentions in Presidential 
speeches”, and proponents suggested “that the only obstacle to scaling-up the ST 
pilots is now financial”, but “ownership within MCDSS is patchy and the 
Ministry lacks the capacity and political clout to make serious headway with this 
agenda”. Crucially, “key decision-makers in MFNP” were not convinced “of the 
viability and desirability” of cash transfers; “there is little evidence that the 
Minister of Finance and others in powerful positions have overcome their strong 
ideological opposition” (ibid: 22). The following year, Chiwele assessed that 
social protection had attracted “little political support” and the Ministry of 
Finance remained “unconvinced regarding its economic merits”: 
 
‘That MCDSS has problems rallying technocratic and political support 
around a coherent agenda of social protection is also seen in the fact 
that a Social Welfare Policy has been under development for the past 
four years. The Ministry of Finance is still unconvinced. Other line 
ministries continue to protect their areas and are not collaborating 
effectively with the MCDSS. Social protection programmes are too 
thinly scattered in various ministries. Larger ministries such as 
Finance, Health, and Education are able to marshal a lot of support.’ 
(Chiwele, 2010: 5, 26).  
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Meanwhile, evidence accumulated on both the benefits and costs of cash transfer 
programmes. A 2008 study by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
funded by DfID, provided much fuller costing estimates than hitherto. The ILO 
reported that public education (fully funded by the Zambian government) and 
public health care (more than half of which was funded by donors) cost 
approximately 14 percent of GDP, and this was predicted to rise slightly. 
Nonetheless, the ILO concluded, there was ‘fiscal space’ to expand social 
assistance programmes from their current meagre 0.2 percent of GDP (part of 
which was funded externally, including by the WFP) to provide for ‘a minimum 
social protection package’. This was defined as comprising ‘affordable universal 
access to essential health care services; targeted social assistance; basic cash and 
in-kind benefits for children (mothers and carers); and a basic universal pension 
for the elderly and for persons with disabilities’ (ILO, 2008b: 5). First, the ILO 
costed a national rollout of Kalomo-style cash transfers, targeted on the poorest 
10 percent of households in each district; the cost of a benefit of just over K 
50,000 (i.e. about $12) per household per month (rising with inflation) would 
rise steadily to about 0.25 percent of GDP, in 2012. The study proposed that the 
Zambian government assume full financial responsibility from 2012 (ibid: 106-
11). A universal old-age pension (from age 60, paying K 60,000 or about $15 
per month) and child benefit schemes (paying lower benefits, for the first child) 
at about 0.5 percent of GDP and 1.2 percent of GDP respectively (ibid: 164).  
 
In 2011, a follow-up study by the ILO concluded that fiscal constraints meant 
that schemes would need to be phased in over five years even with donors 
meeting most of the cost at the outset and half of the cost after five years. Donor 
funding would amount to almost 1 percent of GDP p.a., but this was a small 
proportion of the total European Union aid to Zambia at the time. The study 
assessed that the Zambian government could gradually increase its share of the 
cost through additional taxation (Aguzzoni, 2011: xiv). 
 
As the ILO recognised, the Zambian state did face fiscal constraints. Debt relief 
in the early 2000s improved its external debt position, but it remained dependent 
on grants to keep its budget deficit under control. The government’s response 
was to contain expenditure. With steady growth of GDP, government 
expenditure fell from more than 30 percent of GDP in the early 2000s to about 
25 percent in the mid-2000s (ILO, 2008b). The result was that the government 
had more fiscal space than hitherto, but was reluctant to increase expenditure for 
fear of returning to the fiscal problems of earlier years. The government did, 
however, fund heavily agricultural programmes, including means-tested 
programmes intended to assist poor farmers to increase production. 
 
In practice, the government of Zambia continued to underfund social protection. 
The budget allocation to social protection remained less than 3 percent in 2009, 
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2010 and 2011. The Sixth NDP, published in January 2011, referred grandly to 
the expansion of cash transfers to 300,000 ‘incapacitated’ households by 2015 
(as well as of other cash transfer and feeding programmes). But the budgetary 
allocations did not match this scale-up. The projected allocation to social 
assistance barely rose between 2011 and 2015, despite the envisaged explosion 
in the number of beneficiaries (Zambia, 2011). Interviews suggest that the 
chapter on social protection in the Sixth NDP was dropped entirely from the 
penultimate draft, before being re-included after strident protests from civil 
society and donors.24 There remained an evident lack of political will on the part 
of the government. 
 
In the 2011 elections, however, the incumbent Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD) lost to the populist Patriotic Front, led by Michael Sata. A 
social democratic faction within the MMD had ensured the inclusion of a 
commitment to expanding social protection in the party’s 2011 election 
manifesto. Following his election, Sata restated this commitment, but the 
number of households receiving social cash transfers only slowly increased in 
line with the Sixth NDP. It was not until October 2013 that the Finance Minister 
actually announced an increase in the government’s budget allocation for cash 
transfers beyond the modest growth envisaged by the previous government. The 
increased contribution sounded large – a ‘700 percent increase’ – but this was 
from a tiny base, with only 61,000 households receiving cash transfers, with 
three-quarters of the costs covered by donors. The following year the PF 
government published its Revised Sixth NDP, which included a promise to 
scale-up the poverty-targeted ‘social cash transfer’ scheme to 500,000 
households by 2016. By 2015 the number of beneficiary households had tripled, 
to 190,000 households, with donors paying for only one-sixth of the total cost 
(less in current prices than in 2013) (Siachiwena, 2016). 
 
The 2013-14 reforms represented an important shift, but even the new plans 
were very modest in comparison with the proposals made by the ILO. The 
budgeted expenditure in 2015 amounted to only 0.1 percent of GDP,25 compared 
to the approximately 2 percent of GDP in the ILO proposals.  
 
For about ten years, from 2003 to 2013, international donors and agencies tried 
but failed to persuade the government of Zambia to implement its promised 
scale up of cash transfer programme or to commit necessary funds. Only in 
2013-14 did the government commit any funds, and then the cost amounted to 
only 0.1 percent of GDP. Donors and agencies made relentless efforts to collect 
and present evidence showing that a set of programmes was affordable, poverty-
                                                          
24 Interview with Mutale Wakunuma, 20 March, 2014. 
25 Budgeted expenditure of ZMK 180 million; GDP in current prices of ZMK 190 billion.  
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reducing and developmental, contributing to economic growth. But they failed 
to persuade the MMD government in office until 2011, and had limited success 
during the subsequent Sata government.  
 
For the first five years – from 2003 to 2008 – opposition was personified by the 
Minister of Finance and National Planning, Nga’ndu Magande. Magande 
fervently opposed cash transfers on largely neoliberal grounds. In his view, 
laziness was the primary cause of poverty, and ‘handouts’ promoted laziness and 
a ‘culture of dependency’. Recipients, Magande claimed, spent benefits on 
alcohol. He was opposed even to old-age pensions, because these discouraged 
people from saving for their old age. Magande was indifferent to donors who 
chose to fund cash transfer programmes, but the Zambian government should 
not allocate scarce resources – or accumulate debt – in order to fund 
unproductive ‘handouts’ (Kabandula & Seekings, 2014). 
 
Magande’s views may be extreme, but they were not entirely out-of-line with 
the ideology of other personal MMD leaders, which explains why there was 
little or no pressure from other senior party members in government to scale up. 
Not even the Minister of Community Development supported cash transfers 
enthusiastically.26 The MMD had been formed in reaction to Kaunda regime. 
Kaunda had abolished multi-party democracy, so the MMD championed it. 
Kaunda had adopted disastrous statist economic policies, so the MMD embraced 
free markets. In the introduction to its 1991 manifesto, the MMD had declared: 
 
‘MMD believes that economic prosperity for all can best be created by 
free men and women through free enterprise; by economic and social 
justice involving all the productive resources – human, material and 
financial, and by liberalising the industry, trade and commerce, with 
the government only creating an enabling environment whereby 
economic growth must follow as it has in all the world’s successful 
countries’ (MMD, 1991). 
 
The 1991 manifesto – and subsequent party documents – referred to ‘safety nets’ 
for the ‘destitute’, but it was clear that the government’s responsibility was 
minimally residual. From 2007, in the face of stronger challenge from Sata and 
the PF, the MMD made more generous promises, but its priority remained 
clearly increased production through free enterprise and a smaller state (Larmer 
& Fraser, 2007; Cheeseman & Hinfelaar, 2010).  
 
Sata and the PF government were more populist in general (Resnick, 2014), and 
a faction within the PF advocated expanded social protection. But even after 
                                                          
26 Interview, Michael Kaingu, 10th March 2014. 
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2013 the PF’s plans remained very modest, with expenditure rising to only 0.1 
percent of GDP. The PF might have emphasized its commitment to “delivering 
inclusive development and social justice” (which was the theme of its 2013 
budget that made provision for increased expenditure), and it might have said 
that it sought to reallocate funds to social protection from the MMD’s subsidy 
programmes. In practice, however, the PF retained its predecessor’s productivist 
priorities and skepticism about cash transfers. As the Finance Minister made 
clear in his 2012 budget speech, inclusive development and social justice “will 
not be achieved simply by promoting handouts”; rather he explained, the PF’s 
“fundamental approach is to build a self-reliant people able to sustainably 
generate money for their own pockets”.27 
 
In sum, successive MMD and PF governments in Zambia favoured other areas 
of public expenditure – including especially support for farmers – over social 
protection. The government did face fiscal constraints, but these cannot explain 
the allocation of only 0.1 percent of GDP to the cash transfer programmes. 
 
 
Pension reform in Zanzibar28 
 
In Zanzibar, which comprises a semi-autonomous territory within the United 
Republic of Tanzania, non-contributory, tax-financed old-age pensions were 
introduced in April 2016. The programme was universal – meaning that there 
was no means-test – but was limited to men and women from the age of seventy. 
The value of the pension was a modest TZS 20,000 or just under US$ 10 per 
month. It was funded fully through the budget of the Government of Zanzibar, 
without any direct funding by foreign aid donors. Zanzibar’s recently re-elected 
President, Dr Ali Mohamed Shein, expressed his strong support for the new 
programme and for gradual increases in the value of the pension: “If we record 
admirable growth of our economy, definitely the amount for universal social 
pension will be increased. Our elderly should accept our donation and be patient, 
looking forward for better future”.  
 
The government of Zanzibar declared repeatedly its commitment to reducing 
poverty. It saw economic growth as the most important mechanism for doing so, 
but acknowledged its responsibility for “the poor majority in society”, including 
through ‘safety nets’. The government had long administered a system of poor 
relief through discretionary posho (i.e. small payments or allowances) and 
operated residential homes for some elderly men and women. Up until the 
2010s, however, the governing elite seemed to prefer religious charity to 
                                                          
27 Budget speech, October 2012. 
28 This section is based on Seekings (2016e). 
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government safety net programmes. As across much of Africa, conservatism 
within government was challenged from the outside, by international agencies, 
donors and NGOs. One powerful influence was the World Bank, which helped 
to push the government into a conditional cash transfer programme for poor 
families with children, largely funded by the World Bank. This programme – 
which formed part of the third phase of the Tanzanian Social Action Fund – 
provided between TZS 10,000 and 30,000 per month (depending on the number 
of children in the household) to a total of about 33,000 households by September 
2016. A competing set of agencies – including primarily the ILO and HelpAge 
International (henceforth simply HelpAge) – pushed energetically for a 
universal, non-contributory old-age pension. In 2009, in a report written with the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, HelpAge recommended a pension 
costing 0.85 percent of GDP (with other, more expensive options costing up to 
double this). In January 2010, the ILO (in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Labour, Youth, Women and Children Development) costed a pension for men 
and women from the age of 60, paying TZS 15,000 per month (in 2009 prices), 
at approximately 1.2 percent of GDP.  
 
Support for the proposed pension within the state was initially concentrated 
within the Department of Social Welfare. In 2011-12, the Department began to 
prepare an overarching ‘Social Protection Policy’, established a Social 
Protection Unit, and sent personnel off on relevant courses. Working closely 
with HelpAge, the new Ministry began to sell the idea of a pension to 
bureaucrats in other government departments, government ministers and 
Members of Parliament. In early 2013, HelpAge organized a study tour of 
Mauritius by a team of government officials and politicians. The Social 
Protection Policy was drafted, including an explicit commitment to universal 
pensions, presented as an extension of the ‘existing social pension scheme’ (i.e. 
posho).  
 
These efforts helped to build support for a pension, but there remained enough 
opposition in other ministries to stall the process. When the draft Social 
Protection Policy was presented to the Cabinet in early 2014, some ministers 
queried the proposed pension on the grounds of its affordability. The President 
himself was reportedly in favour, but he proposed that the issue should be 
referred to a technical committee to examine whether – or what kind of – a 
pension was affordable. Whilst the President’s motivation and intention were 
unclear, the decision made it more likely that the government’s final decision 
would be broadly consensual and would appear technocratic. The committee (or 
‘task team’) comprised a mix of pro-reform and skeptical bureaucrats. The 
committee’s first meeting was difficult: “The issue was the budget, what could 
we pay?”, recalls one member of the Task Team; “the Ministry of Finance was 
reluctant to spend money, they said this is what we can afford”. “We all knew 
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that the Ministry of Finance had no money”, recalls another member of the Task 
Team, but even proposals for a modest programme provoked opposition. 
Echoing the World Bank, skeptics argued that committing funds for the pension 
would deprive other programmes, for example infrastructural investments or 
programmes for the youth. They worried that Zanzibar’s foreign donors (“our 
development partners”) don’t like profligacy. They contrasted the proposed 
pension with the World Bank-funded conditional cash transfers, which were 
represented as “helping people to use their talent, to use their energy; it is not 
paying people to sit down and do nothing”. The committee made progress only 
when the sceptics were assured that their concerns were being taken seriously. 
 
The Government’s financial position was indeed parlous, despite strong 
economic growth. The following May the Minister of Finance summarized the 
state of Zanzibar’s economy and public finances in his budget speech. Despite 
healthy economic growth, the government remained heavily dependent on 
foreign aid, which funded most of the development budget and about one-tenth 
of recurrent expenditure (through general budget support). The Government was 
expecting to raise TZS 375 billion in the 2014-15 year, with foreign aid 
amounting to more than TZS 300 billion. The proposed pension would entail a 
sizeable addition to the recurrent expenditure budget. 
 
The question of affordability depended on more specific choices: Should a 
pension be universal or targeted? At what level should the pension be set? From 
what age should pensions be paid? The skeptics quickly conceded that the 
pensions should be universal and agreed to set benefits at about TZS 20,000 per 
month. The stumbling block was the age threshold. Social Welfare officials soon 
abandoned the goal of paying pensions from the age of 60, as recommended in 
the reports from HelpAge and ILO in 2009-10. The Task Team’s report 
recommended an age threshold of 65. This would cost TZS 9.6 billion p.a. or 0.7 
percent of GDP. The Task Team added, however, that if resources did not 
permit this, then the threshold should be 70, which would cost only TZS 6.6 
billion p.a. or 0.5 percent of GDP. Proponents of a younger age threshold 
arranged for the former chief bureaucrat in the Mauritian Ministry of Social 
Security and National Solidarity to visit Zanzibar to meet with key government 
officials and ministers in order to persuade them to follow the lead of Mauritius 
in implementing a universal pension. Despite this, however, the Cabinet opted in 
March 2015 to introduce pensions only from the age of 70. This meant that, 
when payments began in 2016, only about 25,000 people received them, and the 
total cost was only about 0.4 percent of GDP, which was far below the options 
put forward by HelpAge and ILO in 2009-10.  
 
In several respects, the broader social, economic and political context in 
Zanzibar was favourable to the introduction of a pension. Firstly, there was a 
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clear need for financial assistance for the elderly. To a greater extent than on the 
mainland, the Zanzibari economy and society were undergoing ‘de-
agrarianisation’ in that the roles of subsistence agriculture and kin-based 
redistribution and care were both declining. Deep poverty persisted despite 
economic growth, as the benefits of growth barely trickled down to the very 
poor. Secondly, Zanzibar had a tradition of public responsibility for the poor, so 
that advocates of the pension could represent their proposals as improvements 
rather than entirely novel departures from existing policies. Moreover, at no 
point did skeptics or opponents invoke the discourse of ‘handouts’ and 
‘dependency’ that is widespread elsewhere in East Africa. In Zanzibar, in 
contrast, the hegemonic public discourse was one of responsibility, not 
dependency. Thirdly, Zanzibar had very competitive elections, giving the 
incumbent president and party strong electoral incentives to introduce a popular 
reform. Both President Karume (in 2009) and his successor President Shain 
seem to have favoured reform. The fiscal context was not favourable, however. 
The Minister of Finance was broadly supportive, but there was opposition – or, 
at least, ambivalence – among senior bureaucrats in various ministries. The 
cabinet’s decision in 2015 to introduce a universal pension but with the high age 
threshold of 70 represented a compromise. 
 
The Zanzibari case suggests that concerns about affordability need to be 
addressed directly rather than side-stepped. Advocates of welfare expansion like 
to invoke the rights stipulated in international conventions and declarations. But 
fiscal anxieties are unlikely to be dispelled by any rhetoric of rights. In Zanzibar, 
fiscal conservatives felt that their concerns were taken seriously, that different 
options were costed properly, and both the benefits and costs of each option 
were made clear to the Cabinet, which could make an informed decision.  
 
 
Conclusion: The politics of (un)affordability  
 
A government’s assertion that a policy reform is unaffordable might reflect any 
one of several underlying arguments. First, it might reflect an assessment that 
the economic costs of raising additional revenues, whether through tax or debt, 
outweigh the benefits of the reform. This is especially likely if, in the 
government’s view, the additional government expenditure inhibits rather than 
promotes economic growth. Alternatively, it might reflect an assessment that the 
political costs of additional taxation outweigh the political benefits of 
redistributing resources to some poor citizens. Thirdly, it might reflect the 
assessment that this particular reform is not a priority, and scarce funds should 
be spent on other programmes. Other programmes might be more conducive of 
economic growth, or might provide the incumbent president or party with more 
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useful political rewards, or might simply reflect a normative or ideological 
preference. 
 
In exceptional circumstances, the economic costs of increased government 
spending are minimal. Such circumstances existed in Botswana during some of 
the 1980s and early 1990s, when rapidly rising mining revenues encouraged 
profligacy. Since the late 1990s, however, the governments in all four countries 
considered here were well aware of fiscal constraints, at least in the sense that 
the opportunity cost of increased expenditure on one programme was less new 
funding for other programmes. Governments in all four countries have limited 
reforms so as to contain expenditure. Even in Botswana, in 1996, the 
government set the value of the new old-age pension at a low level (most 
obviously in comparison with neighbouring South Africa) with the effect that 
the cost of the programme was only about 0.5 percent of GDP. 
 
In these four country case-studies, the most expensive reforms undertaken since 
the early 1990s each cost 0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP. These included, in 
Botswana, the government’s assumption of financial responsibility for WFP 
feeding programmes and its introduction of old-age pensions. The Zanzibar 
government’s introduction of old-age pensions in 2015-16 was predicted to cost 
0.5 percent of GDP, although by the time the first pensions were paid the cost 
was closer to 0.4 percent of GDP. The South African government’s decisions to 
expand its Child Support Grant each cost about 0.4 percent of GDP. All four 
governments rejected proposals for reforms that would cost more than this. In 
South Africa, child grant reforms that would have cost 1.6 to 2 percent of GDP 
were rejected summarily in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In Botswana, the 
government decided against setting pension benefits at a more generous level 
that would have raised the programme’s cost above 0.5 percent of GDP, and 
later rejected proposed Child and Family Support Grants. In Zanzibar, the 
government decided against setting the age threshold lower than 70, which 
would have raised the programme’s cost above 0.5 percent of GDP. In Zambia, 
there is no evidence that either the MMD or PF governments considered 
seriously proposals from the ILO for pensions that would have cost about 0.5 
percent of GDP or for child grants that would have cost more than 1 percent of 
GDP. 
 
Many of the reforms cost a lot less than this. In Zambia, most obviously, even 
the post-2013 reforms by the PF government cost only 0.1 percent of GDP. In 
Botswana, in 2012/13, the budget for the old-age pension programme had fallen 
to 0.2 percent of GDP as the economy had grown and benefits remained modest. 
The Orphan Care and Destitute programmes each cost about 0.2 percent of 
GDP. Feeding programmes cost more, in total, at about 0.5 percent of GDP, 
whilst the Ipelegeng public works programme cost about 0.3 percent of GDP 
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(BIDPA & World Bank, 2013: x). Whilst the total cost of these safety net 
programmes in Botswana came to about 1.7 percent of GDP, the individual 
programmes were low-cost. In South Africa, only the Child Support Grant was 
expanded substantially, with the cost of other programmes changing little over 
time, as the real value of benefits was not increased and growth in the number of 
beneficiaries was contained.   
 
It seems that reforms costing more than 0.4 to 0.5 percent of GDP are not 
politically feasible in countries such as the four cases considered in this paper. 
Often, reforms costing a lot less than this are not feasible. Precisely why is not 
the subject of this paper, but a large part of the answer involves widespread 
ideological or normative opposition to ‘handouts’ among African political elites 
(see also Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014, on Malawi), such that even in 
competitive party systems incumbent parties are reluctant to promise and then 
implement bold reforms. The point for this paper is that the constraint on 
programmatic reform does not appear to be affordability in simple economic or 
fiscal terms. The political ceiling on reforms is far lower than the ceiling 
suggested in technical studies of fiscal space. In practice, ‘affordability’ in 
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